Trade policy will have to be unified if the member states of the European Community are to achieve their declared objective of creating a homogeneous internal European market by the year 1992. On what principles should such a Community trade policy be based?
B
y signing the Single European Act 1 on 17th February 1986, the member states of the European Community set themselves a new and ambitious objective: to create a Western European economic area without internal frontiers by 1992. Since then, the Commission's White Paper on Completing the Internal Market 2 has served as the starting-point for numerous studies 3 that have examined the components of the internal market and ways of achieving it, but the problems of the foreign trade regime of the "enhanced" Community have been largely ignored. The central issue in this regard is whether realisation of the internal market will permit a further liberalisation of trade with the rest of the world or oblige the Community to erect additional external defences, notably against Japan, the USA, the CMEA and the newly industrialising countries.
In the light of the "philosophy" and wording of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the answer to that question should be unequivocal. The preamble declares the "desire" of the member states "to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy, to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade". Paragraph 1 of Article 110 of the Treaty reaffirms this objective; paragraph 2 then goes on to say that "The common commercial policy shall take into account the favourable effect which the abolition of customs duties between Member States may have on the increase in the competitive strength of undertakings in those States." What applied in 1957 to the dismantling of intraCommunity customs duties, which were the most important instrument of trade policy of that time, should also apply today to the removal of non-tariff barriers. Indeed, the European Council assumes that "action to achieve a single market" will create "a more favourable environment for stimulating enterprise, competition and trade". 4 Accordingly, higher protective barriers against trade from outside would be both inadmissible and unnecessary. This view of the internal market as a pacesetter for further liberalisation is expressed mainly, though not always convincingly, by the Federal Republic of Germany, s supported primarily by Denmark and the Netherlands.
France is the most prominent, but by no means the only proponent of the opposite view -namely that the internal market should be strengthened only if external protection is increased. In 1983 the French Government lent particular force to its argument when it agreed to a series of technical harmonisation regulations -relating to instantaneous water heaters, electrically operated lifts and lawnmowers, for example -only on condition that the New Commercial Instrument s was adopted. 7 This Regulation of 1984 "on the strengthening of common commercial policy with regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial practices" supplements the 1982 Regulation on common rules for imports 8 and the 1984. Regulation on antidumping measures and countervailing duties, 9 in that it covers all other distortions in international competition as a result of illicit trade practices by third countries and thus closes a gap in the Community's arsenal of trade policy weapons. 1~
Member states' differing interests and notions of foreign trade have been able to coexist up to now within the flexible framework of the EEC Treaty and its safeguard clauses. However, this has only been feasible because the continued existence of border controls within the Community makes it virtually impossible to get round national trade restrictions (and exchange controls) by channelling business through "open" member states, a situation that is tolerated in practice by all the member states and the Commission, even though it conflicts with the objective of free trade in goods and services, which has already been achieved formally. However, the choice between opening the Community's doors and restricting access further will become unavoidable at the very latest when internal borders are removed and the "common" internal market is transformed into a "uniform" one.
National Elements in Trade Policy
Concrete trade policy problems will arise mainly from the institution of a "genuine" Community policy to replace the following practices and arrangements geared to serve national objectives and interests:
[] national import quotas, Community import barriers to suit particular member states and Community quantitative import restrictions distributed among member countries (including export restraint agreements extracted from important supplying countries);
[] the division of Community preferences for third countries (especially tariff preferences for developing countries) into national quotas;
[] special arrangements governing relations between individual member states and particular non-members designed to favour the latter.
Other problems will arise when the "new approach" on the harmonisation and reciprocal recognition of national standards and requirements is applied to imported goods from third countries.
As far as the first category of trade measures is concerned, responsibility for trade policy passed de jure 10 from the member states to the Community when the transitional period under the EEC Treaty expired on 31st December 1969. Member states thus lost their power to set national import quotas for products from third countries, but existing quotas remained in force and countries were free to modify them as they saw fit. Some national import restrictions have since been incorporated into Community regulations, while nevertheless retaining their character as instruments to protect producers in particular member states. The number of product groups subject to quotas is particularly high in Italy, France and Ireland but insignificant in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries. Most of these restrictions are directed against imports from specific countries, in particular Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong; in other words they are discriminative. 11
In addition to these overt import restrictions, "voluntary" export restraints by efficient exporting countries have gained increasing importance, both at Community level and in direct trade with individual EC countries. The best known are the ceilings on sales of Japanese cars in the United Kingdom, France and Italy. It is obvious that such agreements can be monitored and enforced only if the importation of Japanese carsor other similarly restricted goods, such as machine tools destined for France -via other EC countries and independent importers can be effectively prevented; the removal of internal frontiers destroys the principal means of control.
Segmentation of the EC Market
Acting on behalf of interested member states, the Community itself has also concluded voluntary restraint agreements with individual countries for a growing number of products or has imposed quantitative import restrictions. The foremost example is that of the textile and clothing sector, for which the Community has concluded trade agreements under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement providing for quotas on a series of particularly "sensitive" goods (including cotton yarn, T-shirts, trousers and shirts) from 23 exporting countries in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. 12 In view of
